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The South American Way: 
Sub-regional Integration under ALBA and UNASUR  
and International Dispute Resolution
Manuel a. GóMez*
Have you ever danced in the tropics?
With that hazy lazy
Like, kind of crazy
Like South American Way
(Carmen Miranda & Bando Da Lua, 1959)
Abstract: This article describes two of the most recent sub-regional integration efforts in South America, namely 
ALBA and UNASUR, including the factors that have contributed to their development. The analysis offered here 
pays special attention to the role played by the Venezuelan government, particularly during the administration of 
former president Hugo Chavez, both in political and economic terms toward the rise and growth of ALBA. This 
article also explains how the heavy dependence on Venezuela’s support was also detrimental to ALBA for it has 
been negatively affected by the crisis currently faced by the Latin American country. In contrast to the case of 
ALBA, this article discusses the rise of UNASUR as a collective endeavor and the efforts of its members to create 
a regional framework that includes a novel proposal of a Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This article describes two of the most recent sub-regional integration efforts in South 
America, namely ALBA and UNASUR, including the factors that have contributed to their 
development. The analysis offered here pays special attention to the role played by the 
Venezuelan government, particularly during the administration of former president Hugo 
Chavez, both in political and economic terms toward the rise and growth of ALBA. This 
article also explains how the heavy dependence on Venezuela’s support was also detrimental 
to ALBA for it has been negatively affected by the crisis currently faced by the Latin 
American country. In contrast to the case of ALBA, this article discusses the rise of 
UNASUR as a collective endeavor and the efforts of its members to create a regional 
framework that includes a novel proposal of a Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes.
Section II of this article describes context and the conditions that led to the rise and 
growth of ALBA and UNASUR as part of the most recent wave toward regional integration 
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in Latin America and the Caribbean. This section also discusses the critical role of Hugo 
Chavez in marshaling the promotion of regional integration in Latin America as a way to 
expand his political base and build strategic alliances throughout the region and beyond. 
This article also offers a comparison between ALBA and UNASUR regarding their scope, 
structure and other features, therefore highlighting some important differences and 
similarities among them.
Section III turns its attention to the proposal made within the framework of UNASUR 
to create a Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes as a better alternative to ICSID. 
This section delves into some of the main features of this proposed dispute processing 
mechanism and briefly mentions some of its challenges. Section IV contains a brief 
conclusion.
2. LATIN AMERICAN INTEGRATION 2.0
Regional and sub-regional integration have been an aspiration of Latin American countries 
for many decades.1 One would imagine that such goals are easy to attain given the 
geographical proximity, comparable challenges and common historical ties that bind the 
countries of the region. Nevertheless, the road to integration has been rocky to say the least. 
Latin American countries have attempted to organize and build strong alliances that help 
them tackle their common obstacles and strengthen their presence in the regional and global 
markets as the European Union emerged, grew stronger and became a powerful global 
competitor.2
With a few exceptions, Latin American arrangements have tended to involve only a 
sub-group of countries and have also mainly focused on trade relations and economic 
integration e.g. MERCOSUR, CAN, CARICOM, CARIFTA, DR-CAFTA. Notwithstanding, 
some of the most recent efforts, in part due to the leadership of countries like Venezuela, 
have also focused on political integration. The two most notable examples of these latter 
efforts are the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our Americas (ALBA, for its initials 
in Spanish: Alianza Bolivariana para los pueblos de nuestra América),3 and the Union of 
South American Nations (UNASUR, for its initials in Spanish: Unión de Naciones 
Suramericanas).4
Both ALBA and UNASUR stemmed or gained force from initiatives championed by 
Hugo Chavez, the self-proclaimed father of the Bolivarian Revolution and president of 
Venezuela between 1999 and 2013. Chavez named his political movement after Simon 
Bolivar, the 19th century Venezuelan hero who led the independence of several South 
American nations from Spain and first proposed the idea of a united continent that would 
stand strong against the colonial European superpowers.5 The 170 years that passed between 
Bolivar’s death in 1830 and the election of Chavez as president of Venezuela in 1999, 
witnessed many ups and downs throughout Latin America.
The former Spanish and Portuguese colonies (Brazil), upon gaining independence, 
were able to attain their own national identities and cultures, build their own legal systems, 
government institutions and other structures typical of any modern society. On the other 
1 Baumann (2008) link 1.
2 Indart, Lengyel (1995) link 2.
3 See, Portalalba (2017) link 3. 
4 See, UNASURSG (2017) link 4.
5 Gómez (2012). 
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hand, they also endured intermittent periods of civil war, political instability, and economic 
crises. Contingent upon their relative wealth, which often derived from the exploitation of 
natural resources, their institutional and political stability, and other factors; some Latin 
American and Caribbean countries did better than their neighbors during certain periods of 
time, but the region as a whole always fell short of attaining an ideal level of progress and 
integration.
The rise of Chavez as a regional leader of sorts and the widespread of his political 
movement was not only a product of his charismatic personality or populist tactics, but also 
the result of Venezuela’s sudden wealth caused by a meteoric increase in the price of oil 
that started in the year 2000. Such perfect combination allowed a relative outsider to politics 
like Chavez to purchase votes, harvest political allies and to also ruffle many anti-American, 
anti-capitalist feathers across the region and beyond. Chavez’s political movement vowed 
to eradicate poverty and inequality, promote economic progress and development, and fight 
the expansion of capitalism by promoting a new version of socialism dubbed ‘Twenty-first 
century socialism’ (Socialismo del Siglo Veintiuno).
Some of the most visible allies were Fidel Castro from Cuba, Evo Morales from 
Bolivia, Lula Da Silva and Dilma Roussef from Brazil, Rafael Correa from Ecuador, Daniel 
Ortega from Nicaragua and Cristina Kirchner from Argentina. Other important leaders from 
Latin America and beyond were also openly sympathetic to the movement and to Chavez’s 
unapologetic demeanor and provocative rhetoric especially against the United States, which 
contributed to cement his image as a world leader for the disenfranchised.
The dawn and dusk of ALBA?
ALBA (which also means ‘dawn’ in Spanish) emerged from a bilateral agreement signed 
between Cuba and Venezuela in 2000 whereby Cuba sent doctors, teachers and sport 
trainers to Venezuela in exchange for a quota of Venezuela’s oil production.6 The agreement 
was marshaled as an effort to promote social welfare through bartering and other forms of 
economic aid between Latin American and Caribbean nations, and was initially promoted 
as an ‘alternative’ to the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) championed by the 
United States in the early 2000s.
ALBA was, in fact, an alternative to the free market proposal of the United States and 
its allies, but its founders decided to drop that reference and instead called it an ‘alliance’. 
The Cuba-Venezuela model was broadened to eventually include nine more countries, with 
Venezuela usually playing the role of patron or financial backer, and Cuba providing the 
manpower and technical assistance.
It is important to highlight the role of Cuba, which since the early 1960s had been 
sending thousands of health workers to Africa, Asia and Latin America publicized as 
humanitarian efforts but with evident political undertones. Critics, who often termed these 
strategies ‘doctor diplomacy’,7 called them out as an attempt by Fidel Castro to spread the 
socialist ideology while eliciting sympathy for the Cuban revolution. Chavez launched a 
renewed version of these programs in Venezuela in the early 2000s, through a series of 
6 See Convenio Integral de Cooperación entre la República de Cuba y la República Bolivariana 
de Venezuela [Integral Cooperation Accord] (2017) link 5. 
7 Beato-Nuñez, et al. (2000) link 6.
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programs called ‘Missions’ (Misiones), which became the centerpiece of that country’s 
social policies and Chavez’s main vote purchasing strategy and clientelistic political 
platform.8
ALBA was much more than a political agreement. Its trade component entailed the 
launching of a virtual regional currency,the SUCRE, that would be used for commercial 
exchanges among those participating in ALBA’s trading bloc instead of the U.S. dollar.9 
The SUCRE was poised to become a hard currency similarly to the European Union’s 
Euro, but its implementation has met some obstacles that are beyond the scope of this 
article.10
Taking advantage of record high oil prices that lasted until the beginning of the present 
decade, Chavez directed billions of US dollars toward the promotion of social welfare 
programs around Latin America and the Caribbean. This strategy allowed Chavez to also 
spread his political ideology and build strong alliances in the region and beyond.11  ALBA 
also gave Cuba a much-needed lifeline to stay afloat and brought renewed visibility to the 
purported accomplishments of the Castro revolution regarding social programs and 
accessible healthcare.
As oil prices plummeted and Chavez succumbed to a terminal disease, ALBA lost 
Venezuela’s financial backing and the political support of its main promoter. Preoccupied 
with the deep economic and political crisis that resulted in part from the sharp decline in 
revenues that hit Venezuela, President Nicolas Maduro, Chavez’s designated successor, has 
been unable to maintain the position of influence that his country once had in the region, let 
alone garner political support for himself.
At the time of writing, the once incredibly wealthy Venezuela is immersed into the 
deepest economic crisis of its history. With more than 80% of the population living under 
the poverty line, widespread scarcity of foodstuff and medicines, one of the highest murder 
rates in the region, and an openly authoritarian regime –the South American country has 
gone from riches to rags in less than a decade and the regional efforts it supported have 
obviously suffered as a consequence.
The absence of Venezuela at the helm of ALBA and the recent shift in the regional 
political landscape has been a debilitating factor for the sub-regional agreement, at least in 
the short term. Only time will tell if these developments signify the dusk of this regional 
initiative, or if on the contrary, they only represent a hiccup in an otherwise successful 
journey toward the realization of Simon Bolivar’s dream.
The rise and transformation of UNASUR
The rise of UNASUR, unlike the case of ALBA cannot be credited solely to Chavez’s 
influence. South American nations had already worked toward establishing important sub-
regional trading blocs like CARICOM, SICA, CAN and MERCOSUR, but these have 
fallen short of the idea of a full and efficient integration.   Table 1 shows the most important 
regional agreements in the region during the 20th century.
  8 Gomez (2012).
  9 See Sucrealba (2017) link 7.
10 Rosales et al. (2011) link 8.
11 Corales and Penfold-Becerra (2011).
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Table 1.  Regional and sub-regional agreements in Latin American  
and the Caribbean
Agreement Date
Central American Common Market (CACM) 1960
Latin America Free Trade Association (LAFTA) 1961
Caribbean Free Trade Area (CARIFTA) 1969
Andean Common Market (ACM) 1969
CARICOM 1973
Latin American Integration Association (LAIA) 1980
MERCOSUR 1991
ALBA 2004
UNASUR 2008
Chavez’s political clout and economic power was certainly important for the creation of 
UNASUR in 2008, but the structure of this sub-regional agreement appears to be less 
dependent on Venezuela than ALBA. Even after the death of Chavez and the change of fate 
that continues to affect the once wealthy and influential South American nation, UNASUR 
members seem to be determined toward reaching their goal.
Very much like in the case of the European Union, economic integration has been only 
part of UNASUR’s plan. Its goals extend to policies and action plans regarding political 
agreements, community identity, energy cooperation, environment, democracy, food, health 
and education.12 The group of twelve member nations (Table 2), some of which are also 
part of CAN, MERCOSUR, the Alliance of the Pacific (AP), and CARICOM agreed to 
create an ambitious supranational structure comprising four bodies,13 twelve ministerial 
councils, a parliament, a regional bank, and an Institute of Government in Health. The 
group has also admitted two observers, Mexico and Panama, and its current rotating pro 
tempore president is Argentina’s Mauricio Macri.
Table 2. UNASUR membership
Country Regional and sub-regional membership
Argentina Andean Community (CAN)-Associate
MERCOSUR
Bolivia Andean Community (CAN)
MERCOSUR-Associated
Brazil Andean Community (CAN)-Associate
MERCOSUR
Chile Andean Community (CAN)-Associate
MERCOSUR-Associated
Colombia Andean Community (CAN)
MERCOSUR-Protocol of accession
CARICOM-Observer state
12 SELA Report at 9; See also, article 21 UNASUR Constitutive Treaty.
13 See, article 5 UNASUR Constitutive Treaty.
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Country Regional and sub-regional membership
Ecuador Andean Community (CAN)
MERCOSUR-Protocol of accession
Guyana MERCOSUR-Framework agreement
CARICOM
Paraguay Andean Community (CAN)-Associate
MERCOSUR
Peru Andean Community (CAN)
MERCOSUR-Protocol of accession
Suriname MERCOSUR-Framework agreement
CARICOM
Uruguay Andean Community (CAN)-Associate
MERCOSUR
Venezuela MERCOSUR-Suspended
CARICOM-Observer state
Mexico (observer state) MERCOSUR-Observer state
CARICOM-Observer state
Panama (observer state)
Trinidad and Tobago (proposed state) CARICOM
The legal framework of UNASUR rests on a Constitutive Treaty signed in 2008 but which 
entered into force on March 11, 2011. Given their membership to other trading blocs, 
UNASUR members have been particularly careful to avoid duplicative efforts and potential 
conflicts that could affect any existing agreements between them, and have vowed to 
harmonize UNASUR with other regional arrangements.
Another important concern of UNASUR members has been the reduction of 
asymmetries that exist among the countries in the region, as a way to attain an equitable 
integration. Several formal declarations issued with the occasion of UNASUR high-level 
meetings have stressed the willingness and commitment of its members to create 
mechanisms of inclusion that level the playing field across the region by eliminating both 
structural and policy asymmetries.14
3. INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION SOUTH AMERICAN WAY
A particularly interesting initiative of UNASUR members has been the establishment of a 
regional Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes. Initially proposed by Ecuador’s 
president Rafael Correa in 2010 as an alternative to the World Bank’s International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)15; UNASUR’s arbitration center aims to 
offer a more transparent, accessible and balanced dispute resolution framework for 
investment-related disputes that arise among member nations.16
The proliferation of numerous multi-million dollar claims filed by foreign investors 
against several South American countries during the last two decades contributed to 
14 Permanent Secretariat of SELA (2017) link 9.
15 See, ICSID (2017) link 10.
16 See, Cancilleria (2017) link 11.
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exacerbate the criticism levied on the traditional dispute resolution framework set up under 
the aegis of the World Bank during the 1960s. Since the filing of the first investment 
arbitration claim in 1972, ICSID has become the premier international forum for the 
protection of foreign investors.
The Center had registered 650 cases, as of December 2017, of which a significant 
number involved Latin American states as respondents.17 The late 1990s witnessed an 
upsurge in the number of cases, the majority of which were logged against Argentina and 
later on Venezuela, in connection with economic activities of foreign investors in those 
countries.18 Ecuador and Bolivia also became targets of ICSID arbitration claims but to a 
minor extent.19 As the docket of ICSID grew, so did the criticism toward the system.
A common reproach was the perception of bias in favor of industrialized western 
countries and the corporations based in their territories. Moreover, given the close 
connection and economic interdependence between ICSID and the World Bank, some 
expressed concern that their access to credit from the latter might be affected by their 
posture toward the former.20
Another apprehension about ICSID was the cost and complexity of the proceedings 
before it, which often times required states to retain prohibitively expensive legal counsel to 
match their corporate opponents. This structural issue, some argued, hindered access to 
justice and efficiency.21 Another criticism to ICSID was the absence of an effective appeal 
or review process that, unlike the existing annulment mechanism set forth in article 52 of 
ICSID Convention,22 could help foster more predictability and consistency.
Both Bolivia and Ecuador denounced the ICSID Convention in 2007 and 2009, 
respectively,23 and Venezuela followed suit in 2012. Even though many perceived these 
withdrawals as a tactical move by the governments of the denouncing countries to shield 
themselves from a series of imminent claims; at least in the case of Venezuela, foreign 
investors have continued to file claims under other (bilateral investment) treaty provisions 
therefore contributing to prolong the status quo. Ironically, the Venezuelan government has 
also trusted its legal defense to foreign – U.S. based – law firms.24
Almost seven years after it was initially proposed, UNASUR’s Center for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes is yet to see the light of day.25 Despite many efforts to make the 
proposal a reality, the state members of UNASUR have not been able to reach consensus 
regarding its framework. Notwithstanding, in January 2016, a high level group of experts 
17 ICSID, The ICSID Caseload-Statistics (2018) link 12.
18 At the time of writing, the current figures are 54 cases filed against Argentina and 44 cases 
filed against Venezuela. 
19 The total of cases filed against Ecuador is 14, and 4 against Bolivia. 
20 Grant (2015) 6.
21 Grant (2015) 13.
22 ICSID Convention, article 52. 
23 The depositary received Bolivia’s notice of denunciation of the ICSID Convention on May 7, 
2007, which pursuant to Article 71 of the Convention, took effect on November 3, 2007. The 
depositary received Ecuador’s notice of denunciation of the ICSID Convention on July 6, 2009, which 
pursuant to Article 71 of the Convention, took effect on January 7, 2010.
24 Argentina, on the other hand, pursued a different strategy by assembling a hybrid team of 
public officials and private practitioners who were able to provide a cost efficient legal representation 
and amass a great deal of experience in representing state entities.
25 Sarmiento (2016).
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that met in Montevideo, Uruguay to fine-tune the Rules and the Code of Conduct of 
Arbitrators26 reportedly reached consensus on about eighty percent of the proposal.27
The most current version of the Rules addresses several important matters including 
the exclusion of certain types of disputes (health, environment, education, energy) from 
being resolved by arbitration unless the states expressly agree to include them.28 Another 
important feature of UNASUR’s Rules is the inclusion of a three-pronged approach to 
dispute resolution not just confined to arbitration (article 16 et seq.) but also including a 
facilitation mechanism (article 11) and conciliation (article 12). The Centre is also supposed 
to have a list of neutrals proposed by the member states, and subject to the Centre’s Code of 
Conduct.
As an additional protection mechanism, the draft Rules also contain a provision 
allowing member states to require the exhaustion of local remedies as a precondition to the 
submission of the dispute to arbitration. On the other end of the spectrum, at the post-award 
stage, UNASUR’s Rules incorporate an appeals mechanism geared to correct errors in the 
application or interpretation of the law, similar to the one that exists under the Understanding 
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) and the Working 
Procedures for Appellate Review (Working Procedures) of the World Trade Organization.29
The proposed UNASUR Centre certainly addresses many of the concerns raised by 
Latin American countries about the ICSID mechanism. If and when the Centre comes to 
fruition its effectiveness will depend on how it is implemented, the level of cooperation of 
its member states, and the receptivity of its users. Predictably, the idea of a South American 
investment dispute resolution mechanism has met some criticism mainly related to the 
perceived risk of political manipulation of UNASUR by its members.
Similarly to how some South American nations have accused ICSID for being tilted to 
favor of powerful transnational interests; those on the other side of the isle have likewise 
criticized the establishment of a Centre motivated by disgruntled disputants. Regardless of 
the validity of this concern, UNASUR’s member nations have the duty to foster the 
credibility and legitimacy of this new mechanism not only to their immediate stakeholders 
but also to the world.
4. CONCLUSION
The two most recent efforts of regional integration in Latin America represented by ALBA 
and UNASUR have moved beyond the traditional economic agreements toward and more 
comprehensive undertaking that pays attention to other social and political issues of 
common interest to the member states. At least in the case of ALBA, the excessive reliance 
on the financial and political support of Venezuela was both the driving force behind it and 
also the main obstacle for its development.
In the case of UNASUR, the situation appears to be slightly different, and the structure 
more stable. In this regard, UNASUR members have also developed initiatives that go 
beyond the traditional scheme of a regional integration regime. A noteworthy initiative is 
the launching of a Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, which purports to offer 
an alternative to the current mechanism sponsored by the World Bank. UNASUR’s Centre 
26 Fach Gomez and Titi (2016).
27 Fach Gomez and Titi (2016).
28 Grant (2015) 28.
29 Perez-Salgado, Perez-Lozada (2016) link 13.
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has been subject to ample debate for more than seven years but it has not been launched 
yet. We will have to wait until that happens to assess whether the effort was worthwhile to 
the state members, its citizens and the foreign investors that engage in business with those 
states.
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